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to share in the estate of the deceased! If both wives are to share
in the deceased's estate, the court is faced with the problem of
determining how the women are to participate. Will they share
equally or will one get a larger proportion than the other?
A statement by Clyde L. Colson, Dean of the West Virginia
College of Law, summarizes exactly the state of West Virginia Law
today because of the wording of this statute. Dean Colson stated
that as the matter now stands it is impossible to deal with the
situation logically and no relief can be had until the legislature sees
fit to go back to the common law rule that bigamous marriages are
void ab initio. He also stated that such a change would clear up
the illogical muddle that the courts are now in. Colson, West Virginia Marriage Law, 43 W. VA. L.Q. 33, 51 (1936).
Thomas Franklin McCoy
Due Process--Requirement That a Prisoner Be
"Duly Cautioned"
D was convicted of breaking and entering. After conviction and
before sentencing, information setting forth two previous convictions
was properly presented to the court. Pursuant to the provisions of the
Habitual Criminal Act of West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art.
11,§§ 18, 19 (Michie 1961), the court sentenced D to confinement
in the penitentiary for the remainder of his natural life. D filed a petition in the United States District Court for Northern West Virginia
praying for a writ of habeas corpus. An order was entered by that
court quashing the writ and dismissing the petition. Held, reversed.
Where the prisoner was not duly cautioned prior to the admission of
his identity and prior to the imposition of the life sentence, "due
process of law" was denied and the sentence imposed under the
statute is void. Spry v. Boles, 299 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1962).
The Congress of the United States has given to the federal courts
the power to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Judiciary and Judicial
Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1959). However, this power
will only inure to the benefit of a prisoner under certain circumstances. The Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c) (3) (1959) provides that the prisoner shall not have the
benefit of the writ unless he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. When a federal
court declares that an act is done without due process of law, its
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reference is to due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution
of the United States. The principal case declares that D was denied
due process of law but the court cites no federal authority for its holding. This case thus appears to have established a rather unique due
process rule.
The denial of due process in the principal case came in the
form of a failure on the part of the trial court to "duly caution" D.
The Habitual Criminal Act of West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ch. 61,
art. 11, § 19 (Michie 1961), states that after conviction and before
sentencing, the prosecuting attorney shall file information relating to
the prisoner's previous record. The court shall then require the
prisoner to say whether he is the same person or not. ". . . after
being duly cautioned, if he acknowledged in open court that he is the
same person, the court shall sentence him to such further confinement as is prescribed...." (Emphasis added.)
When the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia interpreted the nature of due process of law under the West Virginia Constitution, W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10, the court adopted the words
of Mr. Justice Edwards in Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N.Y. 217 (1854).
In essence, Justice Edwards stated that in order to afford one due
process of law, those rules and forms which have been established
for the protection of private rights must be accorded in the due
course of legal proceedings. Peerce v. Kitzmiller, 19 W. Va. 564, 578
(1882). The West Virginia Court has also held, as a matter of
state requirement, that the provisions of section 19 of the Habitual
Criminal Act are mandatory for a valid imposition of further sentence
under the statute. State ex rel. Cox v. Boles, 120 S.E.2d 707 (W. Va.
1961). Duly cautioning being a requirement, it would seem to follow
that the prisoner has been granted a right which, if denied, would be
a violation of state due process of law.
The denial of state due process by a state tribunal does not
of necessity raise a question of the denial of federal due process
for which a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus. "There
may have been some error in the state court practice and procedure,
but the federal court is only interested in whether there has been a
denial of due process as guaranteed by the federal constitution."
Owsley v. Cunningham, 190 F.Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Va. 1961).
Thus, when the court in the principal case exercised its jurisdiction
and granted the writ of habeas corpus, it appears to have established
that duly cautioning is a federally guaranteed right.
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The principal case was decided February 13, 1962. No federal
authority was cited for this holding and the court did not establish
any requirements which are necessary to satisfy the federal guarantee
that one be duly cautioned. On June 26, 1962, the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia rendered a decision enunciating the
state requirements of duly cautioning under the Habitual Criminal
statute. State ex rel, Mounts v. Boles, 126 S.E.2d 393 (W. Va.
1962). However, this case and the requirements therein could not
have been the basis upon which the principal case was decided since
its holding was asserted after that of the principal case. In consequence, the present federal requirements with regard to this newly
guaranteed federal right are not yet clear.
Consider the hypothetical situation in which X, a defendant, has
committed a crime in another state jurisdiction and has been taken
to trial. At some stage of the proceedings, a state statutory requirement compels the court to "duly forewarn" X before receiving
his answer. If that state has previously interpreted the meaning of the
words "duly forewarn", will the federal courts incorporate that interpretation as the requirement for federal due process of law thereby
making federal due process correspond to each particular state's
interpretation of its own statute? If such a method is used, a conflict
is created by the fact that the principal case pronounced that D had
been denied federal due process of law before the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia had interpreted the meaning of the term
"duly cautioned". As an alternative, will the federal courts initiate
a standard which will apply to all state statutes using terms such as
"duly caution", "duly admonish", and "duly forewarn" when determining if federal due process of law has been denied? If such
a
procedure is undertaken, will each state's interpretation of its own
statute be compatable with the federal interpretation or will there
be one rule of due process on the state level and another on the
federal level?
These questions illustrate the possible issues presented by the
decision in the principal case. While to be "duly cautioned" now
appears to be a federally guaranteed right by the authority of this
holding, it is not altogether clear just what that right may be or just
how far its scope will extend.
Charles David McMunn
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